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Abstract 
 
This paper uses Europeanisation theory to explain why, through the enlargement policy 
of the European Union (EU), Croatia converged more successfully with the EU’s acquis 
than Serbia. It assesses two policy areas (compliance with the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia and the Third Energy Package), considering three 
theoretical models (external incentives model, social learning model and lesson-
drawing model) on three analytical levels (domestic, EU, and regional level). On all 
analytical levels, the dynamics of Serbia’s and Croatia’s Europeanisation processes 
best accord with the external incentives model: domestic elites weigh and act upon 
the costs and benefits of the EU’s demanded reforms. These are affected by third state 
interference and the EU’s enlargement strategies. The domestic level further provides 
evidence for the social learning model: the EU’s conduct affects the candidate states’ 
Europeanisation through discursive inclusion and exclusion. The paper finds no 
evidence for the lesson-drawing model: enlargement policy remains an EU-driven 
process. Croatia converged easier than Serbia to the EU acquis as it faced less political 
constraints domestically, is less prone to regional power interference, and was 
subjected to a more consistent enlargement strategy by the EU. 
 
  
Mark Heemskerk 
3 
Introduction: Bringing Europe to the Western Balkans 
 
On 24 March 2020, the General Affairs Council of the European Union (EU) gave the 
green light for opening accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. 
Although receiving only limited media attention due to the mounting COVID-19 crisis, 
this decision constituted a monumental step in the Western Balkan’s gradual 
integration as (potential) candidates for EU membership.1 As a region composed of 
young democracies, many amongst the Western Balkan countries still face 
considerable problems with their public administration and the reliability of their state 
structures. Over the course of the last two decades, the EU has taken up this concern 
and has sought to go beyond simply expanding its membership. Rather, it has sought 
to engage in a process of ‘member state building’ − Europeanising the Western Balkan 
states to strengthen their statehood and integrate them into the European family of 
states.2  
Throughout this process some states have been more successful than others. Croatia, 
traditionally seen as the region’s frontrunner, managed to converge to most of the so-
called Copenhagen criteria relatively quickly.3 It dealt well with the enhanced 
conditionality of the new Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA), and 
progressed steadily through the different stages of the accession process.4 Croatia 
formally applied for EU membership in 2003, it was granted candidate status in 2004 
and accession negotiations opened in 2005. These negotiations were finalised in 2011, 
leading to Croatia’s accession to the EU in 2013.5 For the Republic of Serbia the story 
of EU accession looks quite different. Although Serbia began the path towards EU 
membership in roughly the same period as Croatia, its route has remained full of 
obstacles. Serbia only signed its SAA in 2008, which did not enter into force until 2013.6 
Serbia was declared an EU candidate state in 2012 and opened its accession 
                                                 
1 Council of the European Union, “Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process − the 
Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Albania - Council conclusions”, retrieved 12 
June 2020, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7002-2020-INIT/en/pdf.  
2 S. Keil and Z. Arkan, “Introduction: European Union Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans”, in 
S. Keil and Z. Arkan (eds.), The EU and Member State Building: European Foreign Policy in the 
Western Balkans, Abingdon, Routledge, 2015, pp. 6-7. 
3 M. Vlašić Feketija and A. Łazowski, “The Seventh EU Enlargement  and Beyond: Pre-Accession 
Policy vis-a-vis the Western Balkans Revisited”, CYELP, vol. 10, 2014, pp. 2-3. 
4 Ibid., pp. 20-26. 
5 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations - 
Croatia”, retrieved 18 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/ 
countries/detailed-country-information/croatia_en. 
6 European Commission, “EU and Serbia: enhanced cooperation rules enter into force”, 
retrieved 18 August 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_805. 
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negotiations with the EU in 2014.7 These negotiations are now stuck without much 
prospect for the near future.8 Various political actors have pronounced their worries 
regarding Serbia’s inability to decisively choose a European future due to the  
pronounced Russian and Chinese influence within their economic and political 
system.9  
This paper examines the observed difference in Croatia’s and Serbia’s 
Europeanisation processes. Why has Croatia been better able to converge to the EU’s 
acquis than Serbia? The paper compares their processes at the hand of two policy 
areas that formed considerable obstacles to both Serbia’s and Croatia’s 
Europeanisation, as those may be used best to see why some states overcome their 
obstacles and others do not. First, the countries’ compliance with the International 
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is assessed. Compliance with the ICTY, 
as part of the EU’s transitional justice policy towards the region, was an important 
condition to ensure the candidate countries’ commitment to converge towards the 
EU’s political values and principles.10 The second policy area looked at is the EU’s Third 
Energy Package, that Croatia adopted, but is still heavily resisted by Serbia. As the EU’s 
enlargement policy towards the region remains high on the agenda for the EU,11 an 
in-depth assessment of what factors make Europeanisation in the region succeed or 
fail is crucial. 
This paper finds that the effect of domestic, EU and regional level factors on the 
Europeanisation process of the two candidate member states is best understood 
through the external incentives model. This means that domestic political actors weigh 
the costs of complying with the EU’s demands for reforms against its benefits, acting 
only when the latter outweigh the former. EU and regional factors alter the balance 
within this cost-benefit analysis. On the domestic level, the social learning model of 
                                                 
7 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations – 
Serbia”, 31 January 2018, retrieved 22 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia_en. 
8 M. Karnitschnig, “Mercron’s Balkan breakdown”, Politico EU, 3 May 2019, retrieved 3 May 2019, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/merkel-macron-balkans-serbia-kosovo. 
9 A. Caso, “The Next Enlargement Wave: Serbia caught between Russia and Europe”, 
MyCountryEurope, 7 November 2018, retrieved 20 March 2019, https://mycountryeurope.com/ 
politics/next-enlargement-wave-serbia-russia-eu. 
10 I. Rangelov, “EU Conditionallity and Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia”, CYELP, vol. 
2, 2006. 
11 U. Von der Leyen, “Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with 
President Michel and Andrej Plenković, Prime Minister of Croatia, following the EU-Western 
Balkans Zagreb Summit”, European Commission, 6 May 2020, retrieved 14 June 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_825. 
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Europeanisation provides some additional insights, factoring in a rhetoric of identity 
that constitutes a sense of belonging with, or separation from, Europe. Croatia has 
been better able to converge to the EU’s acquis than Serbia due to several factors. 
Compared to Serbia, Croatia is (1) characterised by a less constrained domestic 
political arena, (2) is less dependent on regional powers interfering in its politics and 
economics, and (3) benefited from a more consistent enlargement strategy followed 
by the EU than the one used towards Serbia. The lesson-drawing model to 
Europeanisation fails to contribute to any explanation for the observed difference 
between Croatia and Serbia. The policy transfer of EU acquis to candidate member 
states proves to be an EU-driven process with candidate states taking up a more 
reactive role. 
The paper is structured in five sections. The first part sets out the analytical framework 
in which the theoretical and methodological choices of the paper are outlined. The 
second section deals with the first case study, Croatia’s and Serbia’s compliance with 
the ICTY. The third section looks at the second case study, the candidate states’ 
adoption of the Third Energy Package. The fourth section analyses the evidence 
provided by the cases in light of the paper’s theoretical framework. Finally, in the 
conclusion the insights of the paper are outlined and summarised. 
 
Theoretical framework  
 
Europeanisation theory is by origin an integration theory explaining the deepening of 
EU integration within and between different member states. It comprises 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, factoring in the influence of domestic 
actors to explain the interactions between the EU and member states’ domestic 
policy, polity and politics.12 It relies on insights from liberal intergovernmentalism, (2) 
multilevel management systems and (3) transformation of governance theory, each 
establishing different theoretical ‘waves’ in the literature.13 The liberal 
intergovernmentalism wave explains EU integration as a ‘bottom-up’ process where 
domestic concerns come to dominate the EU’s integrative trajectory. It looks at the 
struggle between domestic actors, and at how member states elevate their domestic 
                                                 
12 C. Radaelli, “Europeanization: Solution or Problem”, in M. Cini and A.K. Bourne (eds.), 
European Union Studies, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 58. 
13 K. Wach, “Conceptualizing Europeanization: Theoretical Approaches and Research 
Designs”, in P. Stanek and K. Wach (eds.), Europeanization Processes from the Mesoeconomic 
Perspective: Industries and Policies, Krakow, Cracow University of Economics, 2015, pp. 12-13. 
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interests to the European level to shape the EU’s development accordingly.14 In 
contrast, the wave in Europeanisation theory relying on multi-level governance theory 
is seen as the ‘top-down’ wave. This wave views European integration as a tool for 
domestic actors to alter domestic institutional arrangements, justifying these changes 
by referring to Brussels.15 Top-down Europeanisation therefore explains domestic 
changes in policy, polity or politics using integration at a European level as a starting 
point. 16 The third wave in Europeanisation theory is a ’circular approach’, following 
the concept of a “transformation of governance”.17 It combines bottom-up and top-
down insights to argue that EU integration has brought about a total overhaul of the 
functioning of governance, rather than a shift of power between different levels of 
governance.18 Bottom-up and top-down processes feeding back into each other 
have led to a development in which domestic and international actors try to give 
direction to the perpetual cycle of reinforcement between the different levels.19 
Taking these waves into account, Claudio Radaelli defined Europeanisation as a set 
of “processes of construction, diffusion and, institutionalisation of formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and ‘ways of doing things’. It also consists 
of shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic […] discourse, political 
structures, and public policies”.20  
Over time, the explanatory power of Europeanisation theory expanded beyond the 
‘deepening’ dimension of integration into the ‘widening’ dimension. The 
convergence of the regulatory frameworks of candidate states towards European 
norms was conceptualised as a top-down process of Europeanisation wherein the 
domestic politics, policy and polity of the candidate states were reconfigured to fit EU 
standards.21 Europeanisation theory in the widening sense thus concerns the process 
                                                 
14 A. Moravcsik, “Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and 
International Cooperation”, Working Papers, no. 53, Centre for European Studies, Harvard 
University, 1994, p. 63; K.E. Howell, “Developing Conceptualisations of Europeanisation: A Study 
of Financial Services”, Politics, vol. 24, no. 1, 2004, pp. 20-25.   
15 W. Sandholtz, “Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European 
Institutions”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, 1996, pp. 403-430. 
16 Wach, op.cit., p. 14. 
17 B. Kohler-Koch, “Catching up with change: The transformation of governance in the 
European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1996, pp. 359-380. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.; Wach, op.cit., p. 15. 
20 Radaelli, op.cit., p. 59. 
21 e.g. G. Noutcheva and M. Emerson, “Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of 
Democratisation”, Working Document, no. 214, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS), 2004. 
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of policy transfer, with candidate states adopting EU policy to become their own. This 
paper draws on this approach, looking at Serbia and Croatia’s unidirectional 
convergence to the EU’s acquis as a requirement for EU membership.  
To do so, the paper uses a set of explanatory mechanisms as possible explanations for 
the motivation of candidate states to participate in policy transfer. In their book The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier set out three explanatory models, outlining the mechanisms that 
determine the success of policy transfer in different states.22 These three models differ 
in their specific logic of rule adoption (logic of consequences and logic of 
appropriateness), and in which actor they see as the principal actor in the adoption 
process (EU-driven process or candidate state-driven process), as set out in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Theoretical mechanisms of Europeanisation 
Principal actor in rule 
adoption process 
Logic of rule adoption 
Logic of consequences Logic of appropriateness 
EU-driven external incentives model social learning model 
Candidate state-driven lesson-drawing model 
Source: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, op.cit. 
 
The external incentives model 
 
The external incentives model follows an EU-driven explanation based on the logic of 
consequences, and therefore sees Europeanisation as a process dependent on the 
rational, interest-based decisions of actors that bargain through the exchange of 
threats and promises.23 The outcome of the bargaining process is dependent on the 
relative bargaining power of the involved actors, which is again determined by the 
comparative information and resource asymmetries as well as on the parties 
respective alternatives to the standing agreement. 24  
                                                 
22 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of 
Central and Eastern Europe”, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, London, Cornell University Press, 2005, p. 8. 
23 J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, 
International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4, 1998, p. 949. 
24 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, op.cit., pp. 10-12. 
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Following the external incentives model policy transfer is EU-driven as the EU uses 
conditionality to leverage the reward of EU membership for reforms in the candidate 
state. Policy transfer, following this logic, only occurs if the rewards offered by the EU 
outweigh the adoption costs for the candidate state.25 Conditionality is therefore an 
essential vehicle for Europeanisation within the external incentives model. It allows the 
EU to “upset the candidate state’s domestic equilibrium by introducing additional 
incentives for compliance with EU rules into the game”.26 It can do so top-down, 
directly pushing the candidate state’s government to reform, or bottom-up through 
supporting pro-European forces within the political landscape of the candidate 
state.27 The effectiveness of such conditionality depends on (1) the determinacy that 
the candidate state will receive the rewards promised by the EU, as more certainty 
increases the willingness to converge, (2) the speed and size of the promised rewards, 
as those determine the attractiveness of the reward, (3) the credibility of the EU’s offer, 
as a lack of credibility undermines the EU’s offer, and (4) the presence of veto players 
and the level of adoption costs the candidate state faces, as a higher degree of 
adoption costs and a larger number of veto players involved make a candidate state 
less inclined to reform.28 
 
The social learning model 
 
The second model is the social learning model, which, like the external incentive 
model, perceives Europeanisation as an EU-driven process, but it departs from the 
logic of appropriateness. Whereas the logic of consequences centres around the 
rational assessment of the consequences of one’s actions, the logic of 
appropriateness stipulates that actions are motivated by a sense of identity and 
norms. It assesses situations from ethical considerations, virtues and aspired goals in 
conformity with the actor’s self-understanding.29  
The social learning model thus follows the core assumptions of social constructivism, 
conceptualising the EU as an international community with a specific identity and with 
its own norms and values. Following this model, the Europeanisation of candidate 
states depends on whether they consider the identity the EU conveys as appropriate 
                                                 
25 S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig, “EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From 
Leverage to Governance?”, Democratization, vol. 18, no. 4, 2011, pp. 892-894. 
26 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, op.cit., p. 11. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., pp. 12-17. 
29 March and Olsen, op.cit., p. 951. 
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for their own self-perception.30 This identity can be used strategically. During the 
Central and Eastern European Countries’ (CEECs) round of enlargement the EU built 
an identity of responsibility towards these states, to prevent further instability in the 
region after the Soviet Union’s collapse. This significantly aided the CEECs’ accession 
process, as it made them fit easier in the framework the EU provided.31 The 
Europeanisation of candidate states is thus dependent on (1) the perceived 
legitimacy of EU rules and processes, (2) the identity of candidate states, and (3) the 
domestic resonance of the EU’s norms in candidate states.32 
 
The lesson-drawing model 
 
The lesson-drawing model can be based on both logics of rule adoption but differs 
from the other models as it sees Europeanisation as a candidate state-driven process. 
Policy transfer then is a voluntary process led by the candidate state’s policy makers 
and society to draw lessons from the EU’s experiences.33 Domestic dissatisfaction with 
the status quo creates pressure on the candidate state’s political elites to reform. These 
elites then look at the EU’s way of doing things to respond to these demands.34 
Following this model, policy transfer thus takes place when domestic political elites 
believe EU rules and policies are suitable to solve a domestic problem. The model is 
driven by the perceived degree of societal policy dissatisfaction; that is, when the 
perception exists that domestic policies and rules are failing as a consequence of 
changes in circumstances or in political values in society or politics.35 In this model, EU-
centred epistemic communities introduce EU rules and policies as a solution to 
domestic problems.36 The model furthermore considers the ‘transferability’ of rules as 
suitable solutions to the given domestic problem. This depends on whether the EU’s 
rules and policies are in line with the institutions and traditions of governance of the 
candidate state, on whether the solution resonates with the domestic audience of the 
candidate state and on its technical viability.37 
 
                                                 
30 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, op.cit., p. 18. 
31 U. Sedelmeier, “Eastern enlargement: Risk, rationality and role-compliance”, in F. 
Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.) The Politics of European Union Enlargement, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2005, p. 135. 
32 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, op.cit., pp. 18-20. 
33 Ibid., p. 20.   
34 Ibid., p. 21. 
35 Ibid., p. 22. 
36 Ibid., p. 23. 
37 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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Comparative case studies 
 
This paper follows a ‘most similar’ case study design.38 A logic of inductive reasoning is 
applied to two cases that are similar in many respects but differ in outcome. The cases 
are compared step by step to determine the explanatory variables to which the 
observed difference in outcome can be attributed.39 Croatia and Serbia have been 
selected as cases as their outcomes strongly differ, with Croatia’s Europeanisation 
process leading to successful reform and eventual EU membership,40 and Serbia’s 
process being characterised by stalled reforms and stranded membership 
negotiations.41 This while both Serbia and Croatia are successor states to the 
Yugoslavian state,42 and both states experienced a troublesome transition to a 
market-based economy. 43 The policy areas that are used to compare these two cases 
were consciously chosen, as these policy areas formed considerable obstacles to the 
Europeanisation of both states. Compliance with the ICTY was the last hurdle for 
Croatia’s EU membership prospective,44 and the adoption of the Third Energy 
Package is one of Serbia’s biggest hurdles to comply with the EU’s acquis.45  
 
The dependent variable of policy transfer is operationalised following the approach 
used by Laure Delcour in her analysis of the Europeanisation in the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood. She conceptualises policy transfer as the “domestic legal, institutional 
and policy sectoral change in response to EU demands”,46 and relies on Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig’s distinction between ‘rule selection’, ‘rule adoption’ and ‘rule 
implementation’.47 Rule selection refers to the degree to which candidate or 
                                                 
38 D. Toshkov, “Comparative Designs”, in D. Toshkov, Research Design in Political Science, 
London, Macmillan Education, 2016, pp. 267-268. 
39 Ibid. 
40 M.P. Boduszynski, “The trials and triumphs of Europeanization in Croatia”, in A. Elbasani (ed.), 
European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans, Abingdon, Routledge, 2013, 
pp. 39-40. 
41 J. Subotić, “Explaining Difficult States: The Problems of Europeanization in Serbia”, East 
European Politics and Societies, vol. 24, no. 4, 2010, pp. 595–616.   
42 D. Jovic, “Croatia and the European Union: A long-delayed journey”, Journal of Southern 
Europe and the Balkans, vol. 8, no. 1, 2006, p. 88. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Jovic, “Croatia and the European Union”, op.cit., p. 88. 
45 “Serbia cannot continue EU accession talks until energy related issues are resolved”, Serbia 
Energy.eu, 5 April 2018, retrieved 4 April 2019, https://serbia-energy.eu/serbia-cannot-continue-
eu-accession-talks-energy-related-issues-resolved. 
46 L. Delcour, “Theoretical Framework”, in L. Delcour, The EU and Russia in Their 'Contested 
Neighbourhood': Multiple External Influences, Policy Transfer and Domestic Change, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2017, p. 19. 
47 Ibid., p. 20. 
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neighbourhood countries regard the EU’s rules and policy as a ‘normative reference 
point’.48 Rule adoption refers to the transposition of EU rules into the domestic legal 
system, hence, the passing of a bill that translates the EU rule into domestic law.49 
Finally, the concept of rule implementation refers to the extent to which candidate 
states enforce these rules in practice.50  
 
The explanatory variables are grouped into three levels that jointly determine the 
success of the Europeanisation: (1) domestic level factors, (2) EU-level factors and (3) 
regional level factors.51 The domestic level concerns the candidate state’s societal 
and political aspirations, interests and institutional arrangements such as the presence 
of veto players.52 EU-level factors look at the conditionality employed by the EU, the 
demands made and the rewards offered to the candidate state.53 Finally, the regional 
level looks at the interdependencies that exist between the candidate state and third 
actors.54 In the case of the Western Balkans, especially Russia is important in this regard, 
due to its special cultural, geopolitical and economic interests.55 
 
Compliance with the ICTY 
 
The ICTY was established on 25 May 1993 to ensure the prosecution of war crimes 
committed during the various wars that were waged after the disintegration of former 
Yugoslavia in 1991.56 Although Serbia and Croatia had signed a ceasefire agreement 
in September 1991, hostilities continued well beyond that point. The concerns about 
the continued violence between Croatia and Serbia and the war crimes and ethnic 
cleansings perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted the EU and the United 
Nations (UN) to promote full cooperation with the ICTY in the Western Balkans. 57 
                                                 
48 S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig, “EU rules beyond EU borders: Theorizing external 
governance in European Politics”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 800-801. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Delcour, op.cit., pp. 21-26. 
52 Ibid., p. 21. 
53 Ibid., p. 23. 
54 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
55 M. Mulalic and M. Karic, “The Western Balkans Geopolitics and Russian Energy Politics”, 
Epiphany: Journal of Transdiciplinary Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 2014, pp. 92-96. 
56 V. Pavlaković “Better the Grave than a Slave: Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia”, in S. Ramet, C. Konrad and R. Lukic (eds.), Croatia since 
Independence: War, Politics, Society, Foreign Relations, Munich, R. Oldenburg Verlag, 2008, p. 
449.   
57 L. Barria and S. Roper, “How effective are international criminal tribunals? An analysis of the 
ICTY and the ICTR”, The International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 353-354. 
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Although the ICTY itself is, strictly seen, not an EU policy, cooperation with the Tribunal 
is for several reasons a policy transfer. The EU followed a stringent approach towards 
the Western Balkans to ensure their compliance with the ICTY. The EU stipulated full 
cooperation with the ICTY as an essential precondition for the opening of accession 
negotiations with the former Yugoslavian states, describing it as a conditio sine qua 
non.58 The EU even went as far as to integrate the cooperation with the ICTY explicitly 
in the SAAs with the Western Balkan countries and to add it to the Copenhagen criteria 
‘where applicable’ in 2005.59 The EU’s prioritisation of this issue relates to the normative 
role that the EU took upon itself regarding the Yugoslav wars. The EU hoped that the 
ICTY could reinforce the rule of law in the Western Balkans, as well as marginalise ethnic 
nationalism within the region.60 It is the EU’s values, such as international and 
transitional justice, the respect for human rights, a commitment to democracy and the 
rule of law that guided the EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans in 
this respect. Compliance with the ICTY formed the means to consolidate these 
principles within the candidate states’ political systems and societies.61 Accordingly, 
the EU volunteered as a monitoring actor for compliance with the ICTY62 and applied 
its conditionality strictly in this domain.63 
 
Croatia’s compliance with the ICTY 
 
Ever since Croatia’s independence in 1991, the country was led by its authoritarian 
president and leader of the nationalist HDZ party, Franjo Tudjman. He had led the 
country through the Yugoslav wars of 1991-1995, promoting Croatian nationalism and 
regional power in the Balkans. His presidency meant a Croatian age of isolationism, as 
Tudjman was highly suspicious of the EU’s intentions towards Croatia.64 Croatia coming 
to terms with the ideological legacy of Tudjman after his death in 1999, meant a 
country that constantly went back and forth on its willingness to cooperate with the 
ICTY. When the UN Security Council proposed the establishment of the ICTY in February 
                                                 
58 A.J. Perkovic. “National Heroes vs. EU Benefits: Croatia and the EU Conditionality”, CEU 
Political Science Journal, vol. 8, no. 2, 2013, p. 183. 
59 E. Gateva,“EU Conditionality in the Context of the South-Eastern Enlargements”, in E. Gateva, 
European Union Enlargement Conditionality, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, pp. 127-129. 
60 Rangelov, op.cit., p. 371.  
61 J. Mäki, “EU Enlargement Politics: Explaining the Development of Political Conditionality of 
‘Full Cooperation with the ICTY’ towards Western Balkans”, Politička misao: časopis za 
politologiju, vol. 45, no. 5, 2008, pp. 48-53. 
62 Ibid., p. 54. 
63 Rangelov, op.cit., p. 366.  
64 Jovic, “Croatia and the European Union”, op.cit., pp. 88-89. 
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1991, Croatia was one of its strongest proponents.65 On 16 April 1996, the Croatian 
Parliament – the Sabor – even established the ICTY’s jurisdiction as  constitutional law.66 
Croatia’s swift rule adoption of ICTY compliance, however, only took place as the 
Tudjman regime expected the ICTY to exclusively prosecute Serbian nationals, not 
Croatians. When Tudjman realised this was not the case, the Sabor soon declared the 
first law void and stated that Croatia fought a ‘defensive war’ and that war crimes 
committed by Croatian nationals fell outside of the ICTY’s jurisdiction.67 Complying with 
the ICTY would force Croatia to make an exception from its policy of non-extradition, 
which in the eyes of many Croats challenged the country’s newly won independence. 
The EU was seen as the personification of an arrogant, preachy, and unreliable West, 
aiming to undermine Croatia’s independence.68 Tudjman even prohibited all contact 
between members of the Croatian army and the ICTY.69 Only when the UN Security 
Council and the EU threatened to sanction the Tudjman regime if it refused to comply 
with the demands of the tribunal, Tudjman allowed for the extradition of the first twelve 
indicted.70 In October 2000, shortly after Tudjman’s death, the Sabor passed the 
‘declaration on the Homeland War’ which legally established that in 1991-1995 
Croatia had fought a war of self-defence against Yugoslavia. Therefore, it claimed, 
Croatia had solely been a victim of the war with Yugoslavia and the Croatian soldiers 
involved could never be suspected of war crimes.71 The myth of the Homeland War 
seriously affected the Croatian media’s and society’s understanding of the ICTY and 
EU.72 The ICTY and the EU were seen as attacking Croatia’s statehood, which 
obstructed their efforts to ensure Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY.73  
Only with the coming to power of the new Social Democratic President, Ivica Racan, 
in 2000, Croatia reoriented its foreign policy. The newly elected leader of the Croatian 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) believed that closer relations with the EU would 
consolidate Croatia’s status as a sovereign European state and considered ICTY 
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compliance as necessary.74 The Racan government revoked the laws codifying the 
Homeland War myth and excluding Croatian nationals from the ICTY’s jurisdiction. 
Additionally, it passed a law legally establishing full compliance with the ICTY as a 
Croatian obligation, leading to Croatia’s final rule selection and adoption of ICTY 
compliance. 75 In 2001 the SDP government signed Croatia’s SAA.76 Herein, full 
compliance with the ICTY was established as an essential condition for further 
integration.77 The implementation of this commitment, however, proved to be much 
more complicated than expected. The SDP government received many more 
indictments from the ICTY than the Tudjman regime before it. The SDP, wishing to 
comply with the EU’s conditionality, sought to accommodate the ICTY as much as 
possible. Public opposition grew so fierce against the extradition of ‘Croatia’s heroes’ 
that Racan faced large-scale protests and even opposition within its own cabinet.78 
To prevent losing his majority, Racan became less cooperative with the ICTY.79 When 
the HDZ began using the indictments of the popular former generals Ante Gotovina 
and Janko Bobetko as a rallying point for the upcoming elections,80 Racan felt he 
needed to disregard the ICTY’s demands and allowed Gotovina to escape from the 
country without any resistance and Bobetko to die of old age without standing trial.81   
During the following elections, the HDZ managed to capitalise on the societal 
discontent with Racan’s government over the indictments of Gotovina and Bobetko. 
Promoting itself as the “opponent of the ‘devaluation of the Homeland War’”82, the 
HDZ’s new leader, Ivo Sanader, heavily criticised the SDP for extraditing Croatian 
soldiers to The Hague. The HDZ won 43% of the vote, enough to overtake the SDP as 
biggest party. The EU and ICTY feared that the new HDZ government would backtrack 
on the progress made by the SDP and refuse further cooperation with the ICTY. 
Surprising everyone, Senader however formed a coalition government with a Serbian 
minority party, abolished the anti-ICTY rhetoric and marginalised former Tudjmanists 
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within his party.83 The HDZ reformed itself as a centre-right pro-EU party, completely 
changing the dynamics of Croatian politics. An informal ‘Pact for Europe’ formed 
between the government and the opposition, who agreed that EU accession was to 
be Croatia’s foremost political priority and that compliance with the ICTY was 
necessary to attain that goal.84 
By the time that Croatia applied for EU membership in 2003, its political landscape had 
become less focused on the Gotovina case, and HDZ’s government enjoyed strong 
support while arguing in favour of compliance with the ICTY. 85 Nevertheless, Sanader 
refused to address the indictment of Gotovina, who, despite the EU’s conditionality, 
remained at large.86 The European Commission noted Croatia’s progress in its 
published opinion on Croatia’s bid for EU membership, although admitting more 
progress needed to be made.87 The opening of negotiations for Croatia’s accession 
were accordingly set to start on 17 March 2005, on the condition that Croatia would 
continue to comply.88  
While the Croatian authorities claimed not to know where Gotovina was, a chain of 
scandals revealed that the Croatian intelligence service that was tasked with 
localising Gotovina, was instead collecting evidence to dispute Gotovina’s 
indictment; and that Gotovina was still receiving his pension payments and had 
unhindered access to his Croatia bank accounts.89  
Sanader promised the EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana, that Croatia would 
take all appropriate measures to bring Gotovina to justice. The European Commission 
had, however, lost its patience and in its 2005 negotiation framework it declared 
Croatia was no longer in compliance with the ICTY. This conclusion was supported by 
the ICTY itself.90 On 16 March 2005, one day before accession negotiations would be 
opened, the European Council stated in its Council Conclusions that the EU would 
refrain from doing so until Croatia was fully cooperating with the ICTY.91 Responding to 
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this strong display of EU conditionality, the Senader government increased its 
information sharing practices with the ICTY. In October 2005, the ICTY’s Chief 
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte declared that Croatia was finally fully complying with the 
ICTY, after which the EU opened Croatia’s accession negotiations. In December 2005, 
Ante Gotovina was arrested and extradited to the ICTY in The Hague, signifying 
Croatia’s final rule implementation of ICTY compliance.92 
 
Serbia’s compliance with the ICTY 
 
In January 2001 Serbia’s former authoritarian president, Slobodan Milosevic, was 
overtaken in elections by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition (DOS).93 
Although the new DOS-led government proved more open to reforms, populist 
rhetoric from parties such as the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) constrained the political 
momentum for reforms.94 This in turn affected Serbia’s ability to comply with the ICTY. 
Milosevic had rallied against the Tribunal, as negative sentiments towards the ICTY 
remained largely predominant in Serbian society.95 The new government was 
internally heavily divided over the issue. While the new Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic 
wished to increase Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, many of his ministers felt 
threatened by the idea of cooperating with the ICTY due to the possibility of personal 
implication.96 The cabinet split over the question of a ‘hard’ transition or a ‘soft’ 
transition to liberal democracy in Serbia, with the ICTY as a symbolic element to this 
political demarcation.97 Furthermore, during its rule the Milosevic regime had recruited 
various figures from the criminal underworld to serve in important public or private 
positions. These Milosevic cronies now fought the ICTY’s requested arrest of Milosevic 
to avoid being exposed.98 It was only after the US and the EU had threatened 
economic sanctions that Milosevic was arrested in 2001, prompting mass protests 
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against the regime in power.99 On 12 March 2003, tensions came to a climax as Prime 
Minister Djindjic was killed by a sniper while on his way to the office. The incident 
highlighted just how deeply the criminal world had established itself in the political 
landscape of Serbia. 100 
The subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections in November and December 
2003 further consolidated Serbia’s non-compliance with the ICTY. Closely before the 
vote, the ICTY indicted four former generals that had served under Milosevic, turning 
the issue into a central theme of the elections.101 The ICTY had become an enormously 
unpopular institution right before the elections, leading most parties, including the 
DOS, to run on an anti-ICTY platform. The most outspoken critic of the ICTY remained 
the SRS, which won the elections in a landslide, accumulating over 46% of the votes.102 
As the SRS, however, failed to form a coalition government, the chance was given to 
the Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS), led by Vojislav Koštunica.103 Leading a minority 
government dependent on the support of the Serbian Socialist party (SSP), Koštunica 
opened a new chapter in Serbia’s relationship with the ICTY. Koštunica struggled to 
balance the wishes of the pro-cooperation forces of his own coalition with the anti-
ICTY sentiments of the Socialist Party.104 He was therefore regularly pressured to ignore 
indictments from the ICTY to keep his government afloat.105 To increase the incentive 
for Serbia to cooperate with the ICTY, the EU’s External Relations Commissioner, Chris 
Patten, made the EU’s SAA feasibility study on Serbia dependent on its ICTY-
compliance.106 Compliance became a hard condition for Serbia to attain its SAA, and 
was expected to cultivate goodwill from the EU in the negotiations on the future of 
Kosovo and Montenegro.107 Koštunica therefore called on the indicted generals to 
‘surrender voluntarily’.108  Consequently, even though Serbia was not yet declared to 
be in full cooperation with the ICTY, the EU published its feasibility study and opened 
SAA negotiations with Serbia.109 
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The pragmatic decision to cooperate with the ICTY was badly received by the Serbian 
public. The Koštunica government tried to spin the extradition of the generals as “the 
sacrifice of brave victims of an unjust international system, doing their patriotic duty to 
help Serbia’s rehabilitation with the international community”.110 This approach 
backfired when ‘the butcher of Srebrenica’, Ratko Mladic, refused to surrender 
voluntarily. While the EU would suspend SAA negotiations if Mladic was not extradited, 
the SRS and SSP were frantic supporters of Mladic and threatened to drop their support 
for the coalition if the government would arrest him.111 The only thing Koštunica could 
do was promising better compliance in the future, without taking any concrete actions 
at that moment.112  
Serbia’s pathway to association with the EU remained stuck in this impasse, until on 17 
February 2007 the EU suddenly walked back on its hard line. The EU declared it was 
willing to reopen the SAA negotiations, in the hope of gaining Serbia’s goodwill to find 
a peaceful compromise on the issue of Kosovo’s status. Quickly thereafter Serbia 
signed its SAA with the EU even though Mladic still was at large.113 Some member states 
disputed this decision and refused to ratify the SAA until Mladic was extradited to the 
ICTY. Most adamant in this position were the Dutch, who held up firm opposition 
against Serbia’s SAA in the next one and a half year.114 Another reason for the EU’s 
changed approach was that it hoped to sway the Serbian parliamentary elections of 
that year in favour of more pro-EU parties. The elections, however, resulted in such a 
division of seats that the Democratic Party of Boris Tadić could not reach a majority in 
parliament with its priorly envisioned coalition. He needed the support of one more 
party, leading the Serbian Socialist Party, that still vigorously opposed cooperation with 
the ICTY, to become the kingmakers in the new coalition.115 The problem was that 
although politically Serbia went back and forth on the issue, Serbian society had only 
hardened in its opposition against the ICTY and still supported Mladic. Similarly, 
although EU membership was supported amongst Serbian politicians, only a very small 
number of them also supported European values and ideals. The Serbian leadership 
handled compliance with the ICTY with a pragmatic attitude, only moving towards it 
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when there were clear political benefits of doing so.116 Serbia’s willingness to 
acquiesce with the EU’s demands was further complicated by the Kosovar unilateral 
declaration of independence in February 2008.117 
As the Dutch and Belgians doubled down on their opposition and the Serbs refused to 
give in, the SAA negotiations were, again, put on hold.118 The former conceded a year 
later, after High Representative Javier Solana had extensively lobbied The Hague and 
Brussels to soothe their concerns. At the same time, the ICTY declared Serbia was in 
(partial) ‘cooperation’119 with the international tribunal. Serbia’s SAA was therefore 
ratified in 2009 and Serbia applied for EU membership in 2010.120 While the Commission 
wished to push for a ‘fast-track’ for Serbian membership to the EU, the Netherlands 
reacted sceptically to the prospect of paving the way for Serbian membership to the 
EU as long as no full compliance with the ICTY was guaranteed. On 2 June 2011, Serbia 
arrested Mladic and Goran Hadzic, the last two indicted individuals by the ICTY, 
demanding the EU to grant Serbia candidate status in return.121 The ICTY declared that 
as of July 2011 all fugitive Serbians had been extradited to the ICTY, meaning Serbia 
was now finally in full compliance.122 Although Serbia thus eventually implemented the 
EU’s rule of compliance with the ICTY, it never went through the process of rule 
selection or adoption. 
The second case study is the policy transfer of the Third Energy Package into Croatian 
and Serbian law. 
 
The Third Energy Package  
 
The Third Energy Package is a set of two directives and three regulations, put into place 
by the EU to strengthen the functioning of the common energy market.123 It builds 
upon the legal framework provided by the First Energy Package of 1996 and expands 
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on the Second Energy Package of 2003, that places member states under more 
stringent obligations to unbundle their gas and electricity industries and to stimulate 
competition in energy generation and supply.124 The Third Energy Package established 
rules in five areas: (1) the further unbundling of energy suppliers in both the gas and 
electricity markets; (2) a strengthening of the independence of energy market 
regulators; (3) the establishment of the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER); (4) increased cooperation between European Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs); and (5) enhanced transparency of retail markets.125 With these 
measures the EU aims to make its common energy market better adapted to 
consumer demands. It keeps prices and competition in the energy market fair, assures 
the EU’s security of supply and stimulates the use of renewable energy sources. 
Especially the vertical unbundling of energy markets forms an essential element of the 
package. The functional unbundling of upstream and downstream infrastructure (or 
alternatively the unbundling of ownership over such infrastructure) is a ‘make or break’ 
step in the development of fair competition within the EU’s energy market as it is 
essential to prevent monopolistic competition from taking over the market.126 Russia 
heavily opposes the unbundling regime, as it perceives to be specifically targeted by 
the legislation, and it complicates its geopolitical and economic interests.127 
 
Croatia’s compliance with the Third Energy Package 
 
Croatia’s policy transfer of the Third Energy Package only gained momentum after the 
death of Franjo Tudjman and the following marginalisation of his cronies. As discussed 
before, Tudjman had sought to isolate Croatia from the EU’s influence and had 
rejected legal approximation with the EU. The convergence of beliefs regarding the 
European future of Croatia between the SPD government and the HDZ consequently 
allowed faster progress in Croatia’s approximation with the EU acquis also in the 
domain of energy.128 In this renewed political landscape, Croatia was much more 
open to reforms liberalising its economy. The signing of Croatia’s SAA in 2001 further 
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confirmed this ambition and gave Croatia a prospect on EU membership in return.129 
As Croatia’s adoption of the EU’s First Energy Package was a part of the ambitions set 
out in the SAA, this moment proved Croatia’s commitment to legal harmonisation in 
the energy sector.130 The EU demanded considerable reforms from Croatia, including 
increased efforts to combat corruption in the civil service and in public 
procurement.131 Despite continued scepticism towards the benefits of these reforms 
among Croatia’s ruling elites, international pressure led to the adoption of five laws 
transposing the First Energy Package into Croatian law.132 Croatia accepted the basic 
principles of the EU’s energy market, such as market and price transparency, the 
freedom of energy exchange, and the opening up of free trade in electricity and 
gas.133 The transposition of the First Energy Package, although implemented 
improperly,134 formed the legal point of departure for further energy market reforms in 
Croatia and effectively meant its rule selection of EU energy market legislation.  
Croatia transposed the Second Energy Package through multiple acts regulating its 
gas and electricity market in 2004. The application of these laws yielded varying results 
in both sectors. While Croatia’s gas market was unbundled to such a degree that it 
even satisfied elements of the Third Energy Package, its electricity market saw little 
reform in practice.135 This correlates with the fact that although until 2012 Croatia 
produced 70% of the gas needed for domestic consumption, it remained dependent 
on interconnections with its neighbours for its security of supply of electricity.136 Croatia 
set up the Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency (CERA), creating an independent 
regulatory agency for its energy market − although in practice still linked to the 
government.137 
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As part of Croatia’s bid to accede to the EU, the European Commission in 2007 
assessed the state of the Croatian energy market in chapter 15 of its screening report 
for the opening of accession negotiations. Although Croatia was still not completely 
in line with the standards required for membership, the Commission concluded that 
the laws put in place were ambitious enough to ensure the strengthening of its oil stock 
reserves, and to open the path towards an unbundling of the HEP Holding Group, 
Croatia’s monopolistic and fully state-owned electricity corporation.138 The 
Commission was therefore satisfied with Croatia’s overall progress139 and opened 
negotiations on chapter 15 without opening benchmarks.140 Croatia’s extensive legal 
convergence to the European norm thus paid off, as Croatia was given the benefit of 
the doubt by the Commission over the progress it had already made. 
Following the opening of negotiations in 2008, the Council published its conclusions on 
the fifth meeting of the Accession Conference with Croatia, setting out the closing 
benchmarks regarding chapter 15. These concerned standards for nuclear safety, the 
adoption of a new mining act, and legislation to comply with the EU’s 2020 climate 
goals.141 Most importantly, however, Croatia needed to “fully implement EU legislation 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and natural gas and on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity” to close 
chapter 15.142 This position was further elaborated on by the Council in internal 
documents and meant that although Croatia was in compliance with the Second 
Energy Package, the Council considered it an essential criterion for Croatia to comply 
with the common energy market rules of the recent Third Energy Package, that would 
enter into force before Croatia’s accession.143 The Council therefore concluded that 
Croatia complied with the closing benchmarks it had set out for chapter 15, but that 
closing the chapter remained conditional on Croatia’s full transposition of the Third 
Energy Package. This turned Croatia’s adoption of the Third Energy Package into the 
ultimate condition for EU membership.144 Croatia transposed the Third Energy Package 
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through several acts in 2012-2013. Amongst these acts, the Electricity Market Act and 
the Gas Market Act were the most important. The latter unbundled the HEP Group’s 
transmission utilities from its generation utilities,145 marking Croatia’s full transposition of 
the Third Energy Package. Shortly thereafter, Croatia acceded to the EU as its 28th 
member state.146  
Croatia’s implementation of the Third Energy Package met no big problems. In the 
electricity sector Croatia promised in 2013 to unbundle the HEP Group’s supply and 
transmission utilities in the next three years. By November 2016, it had functionally 
unbundled the HEP Group following the 2016 creation of HEP Elektra for energy supply 
and the 2013 creation of HEP Operator Prijenosnog Sustava for transmission 
operation.147 In the gas sector, internal reforms allowed Croatia to restructure its 
market from a monopoly into an oligopoly with a shift in the ownership structure of the 
gas utilities of the HEP Group.148 Also the role of CERA was considerably strengthened. 
CERA gave out significantly more licences in the supply and distribution sides of 
Croatia’s gas sector to new actors that sought to compete with the HEP Group, 
showcasing its increased political independence.149 Also in the domain of supply 
security, Croatia made considerable progress. In 2011 Croatia diversified its gas 
imports away from Russian gas, switching to supply from the Italian company ENI.150 
Additionally, when the Commission deemed Croatia’s participation in the 
construction of the Russian South Stream Pipeline inconsistent with the Third Energy 
Package’s unbundling regime, Croatia dropped the project and redirected its 
investments into Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) infrastructure.151 Croatia therefore 
managed to ensure rule implementation after its accession. 
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Serbia’s compliance with the Third Energy Package  
 
Serbia’s process of rule selection, adoption and implementation of the Third Energy 
Package strongly contrasts with Croatia’s. Already in 2006 Serbia committed itself to 
the active legal approximation with the EU in the energy sector through its accession 
to the EU’s Energy Community.152 Doing so, Serbia explicitly accepted the EU’s acquis 
as the norm to converge to. Later Serbia did in fact undertake many of the legal 
measures to transpose the EU’s rules and regulations of the First and Second Energy 
Packages. Between 2005 and 2010 Serbia adopted three energy strategies outlining 
plans for the adoption and implementation of the EU’s First, Second and Third Energy 
Packages, with mixed results.153 On the one hand, Serbia adopted the 2011 Energy 
Law, codifying a large part of the Third Energy Package. It strengthened the role and 
independence of the Energy Agency of the Republic of Serbia (AERS) and rewrote its 
unbundling regime. On the other hand, however, the Serbian government did very 
little to enforce these laws.154 In the electricity sector, the two most important energy 
enterprises, EMS (Elektromreza Srbije) and EPS (Elektroprivreda Srbije), never saw any 
real unbundling.155 In the gas sector, Serbia refused to release state ownership over 
the energy company ‘Srbijagas’ and also here did not implement the unbundling 
regime it had adopted.156 
The European Commission therefore negatively assessed Serbia’s legal approximation 
within the energy domain. In its 2014 screening report on the opening of negotiations 
on chapter 15, the Commission established that Serbia had shown “a general 
intention” to adopt and implement the EU’s energy acquis, but that it would still require 
Serbia ”considerable additional work” to ensure its compliance in this domain.157 The 
EU therefore established multiple explicit benchmarks for opening chapter 15. Serbia 
had to increase its efforts in complying with the appropriate levels of oil stock reserves, 
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needed to ensure the full unbundling of its gas sector and was to refrain from 
endeavours that would be in breach with the unbundling regime of the Third Energy 
Package.158 The EU applied its conditionality more strictly in the case of Serbia than in 
Croatia. The Third Energy Package had been much newer when accession 
negotiations were opened with Croatia, than when Serbia was going through the 
same process.159 Serbia was given until 1 January 2015 to implement the Third Energy 
Package, including its unbundling regime.160 In 2014 it started to officially restructure its 
gas sector. In 2017 Serbia officially separated Srbijagas’ assets for gas transport and for 
gas distribution into two separate companies. In practice, however, Srbijagas 
continued to operate as one company.161  
As explained by EU officials in a series of interviews, Serbia’s reluctance towards energy 
sector reform is best explained with the extensive influence of Russian actors and 
energy companies. This confronts Serbian officials with a clear dilemma. While the EU 
expects Serbia to reform its energy sector to make progress on its track towards EU 
membership, Serbia remains both politically and economically indebted to Russia, 
whom it cannot afford to alienate.162 Russia’s presence in Serbia’s energy sector is very 
significant. In the gas sector, Gazprom owns large amounts of shares in Serbia’s largest 
companies. It owns a controlling majority of shares over NIS, after it bought the Serbian 
gas enterprise in 2008 for one-third of its value as part of the energy agreement 
between the two states. This arrangement was allegedly a ‘tit-for-tat bargain’ for 
Russia’s support to Serbia during the Kosovo crisis.163 Gazprom also exercises strong 
influence over Srbijagas as long-term contracts between Srbijagas and Gazprom have 
indebted the former to such an extent that Gazprom could cut the gas supply at will.164 
This situation is the result of the creation of the joint-venture ‘Yugorosgaz’ between 
Srbijagas (25%) and Gazprom (75%). Gazprom sells its gas to Yugorosgaz, which then 
resells the gas to Srbijagas at a 4% premium. Srbijagas then sells the gas back to 
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Yugorosgaz, which distributes the gas in southern Serbia. This odd arrangement forms 
a major liability for Serbia as it had led to repeated extensive losses for Srbijagas.165 
In the electricity sector, the presence of Russian interests is also very visible. EPS, 
responsible for the domestic electricity production, has held a monopoly since 1992 
when the Republic of Serbia was founded.166 As a powerful state utility, the EPS 
provided former political elites from the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) with a handy 
political tool.167 The control over such utilities can provide considerable political clout 
as it allows political actors to threaten energy disruptions to gain leverage. 
Additionally, it provides politicians with an additional cashflow which can be misused 
for personal gain or for campaign financing.168 The SPS used the EPS to strengthen its 
political cronies through state resources. Many of these cronies again maintain close 
relations with Gazprom.169 
Russia’s economic interference in Serbia’s energy sector negatively affects the latter’s 
ability to implement the Third Energy Package. In the gas sector, the Serbian 
government avoids implementing rules going against the interests of Gazprom.170 
Russia vocally supports Serbia in the Kosovo dispute, while also exercising significant 
control over the Serbian energy market. Russia is using its political leverage and 
economic weight in the energy sector to limit Serbia’s Europeanisation.171   
In the electricity sector, the SPS’ cronies with a personal stake in keeping the status quo 
have entrenched themselves firmly as a political force in the EPS. They remain in a 
powerful position to oppose the Serbian government and their plans to unbundle the 
electricity sector, making progress excruciatingly difficult.172 The final reason for the 
lack of progress is Serbia’s scepticism towards the EU’s commitment to Serbia’s future 
membership. Serbia wishes for EU membership but is unwilling to take the hard steps 
and decisions that are needed to get there.173 To implement the Third Energy Package 
Serbia would incur considerable political and economic costs from alienating Russia, 
and even then, Serbia’s accession to the EU as a member state is not guaranteed. 
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Therefore, Serbia prefers to wait as long as possible with implementing the Third Energy 
Package.174 In 2018 the EU published a progress report on Serbia’s efforts, stating little 
progress was observed.175 The EU keeps demanding that Serbia unbundles its gas 
market enterprises, yet the process seems to be completely stuck on the Serbian side. 
With the empirical evidence laid out, the next section will analyse the cases in light of 
the paper’s theoretical framework to provide an explanation for the different paths 
along which Croatia and Serbia moved towards their Europeanisation. 
 
Analysis: explaining the Europeanisation of Croatia and Serbia  
 
Compliance with the ICTY 
 
The candidate states’ paths towards full compliance with the ICTY differ strongly from 
one another. Croatia was faster than Serbia, and unlike Serbia went through all the 
stages of Europeanisation (rule selection, adoption, and implementation). Croatian 
political elite openly took up cooperation with the ICTY as a serious policy target (rule 
selection), the Croatian Sabor codified cooperation with the ICTY as an obligation in 
national law (rule adoption) and Croatia extradited its indicted generals to the ICTY 
faster and with far less resistance than Serbia (rule implementation). Serbia, however, 
although it did eventually cooperate extraditing indicted individuals to the ICTY (rule 
implementation), never envisioned cooperation with the ICTY as a policy target for its 
own sake (rule selection), nor did it ever codify cooperation with ICTY as an obligation 
into national law (rule adoption). 
This difference can is explained through several factors. On the domestic level, both 
states started out with a political and societal environment strongly opposing the ICTY, 
but the consensus in Croatia that eventually emerged between the HDZ and the SDP 
on the country’s European future enabled Croatia to take concrete steps towards 
cooperating with the ICTY. This was especially visible during the arrest and the 
extradition of Ante Gotovina, which was first strongly opposed, but later condoned, as 
necessary. In Serbia, however, the continued political relevance of the SPS and its 
cronies’ strong connection with the criminal underworld formed a big obstacle to 
Serbian compliance with the ICTY, as it remained an issue that most coalitions refused 
to address. In societal terms, Croatia made more progress in acknowledging the 
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legitimacy of the ICTY than Serbia did, where the organisation was still seen as a 
foreign threat.  
On the EU level, the EU’s conditionality strategy remained much more consistent and 
effective in the case of Croatia than with Serbia. Negotiations on Croatia’s SAA were 
only put on hold once and on clear conditions. Similarly, the decision to continue the 
negotiations was only taken after a statement of full compliance by the ICTY’s 
prosecutor was issued. In Serbia’s case, however, the EU acted inconsistently. The SAA 
negotiations were stopped when Serbia refused to comply, then were continued even 
though Serbia had not changed its behaviour, and then stopped again over member 
state concerns. This affected the EU’s credibility in Serbia’s eyes, and failed to provide 
Serbia with a clear and consistent path to accede to the EU as a member state. 
Regional factors did not play a serious role in either of the states’ processes. An 
exception here is the Kosovo issue, which severely shook up Serbia’s relations with the 
EU, and negatively impacted the effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality.  
 
Compliance with the Third Energy Package 
 
Regarding the policy transfer of the EU’s Third Energy Package, the Europeanisation 
processes of Croatia and Serbia strongly differ. While in Croatia the change in political 
leadership led to the marginalisation of autocratic forces and a commitment to its 
‘European path of development’, Serbia continues to struggle in its reforms for multiple 
reasons. Former cronies of the Serbian SPS still hold key functions in important veto 
points in the energy sector, interacting strongly with Russian investment and 
geopolitical interests, constraining Serbia’s ability to implement the Third Energy 
Package. This highlights an interplay between domestic and regional factors affecting 
the height of adoption costs of the Third Energy Package. Whereas Croatia’s 
marginalisation of Tudjman’s cronies freed its hands to select, adopt and implement 
the EU’s acquis, the personal and professional relations between Gazprom and SPS 
elites in Serbia’s energy sector make it too costly for Serbia to effectively implement 
the Third Energy Package. Actively implementing the regime of the Third Energy 
Package would put into question Russia’s support in the case of Kosovo, as Russia 
would fear to lose its foothold in the Serbian energy sector. This means Russia has strong 
leverage over Serbia to put off said implementation and a clear motive to do so. 
Additionally, the personal interests of Serbian SPS elites in veto positions within the 
industry would be harmed by the implementation of the Third Energy Package. To 
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maintain control over the sector and its cash flow, they use their influence to prevent 
the Third Energy Package’s policies from being adopted and implemented. 
On the EU level, the EU’s usage of conditionality differed radically between the two 
countries. Where the EU applied conditionality in Croatia in a more phased, direct and 
consistent manner (i.e. making the accession of Croatia conditional on the adoption 
of the Third Energy Package), the EU took a harsher approach with Serbia. Serbia was 
expected to fully implement the Third Energy Package, even before chapter 15 would 
be opened. The EU thus offered clearer and more direct rewards for compliance 
demands to Croatia than it did to Serbia. 
 
The mechanisms of Europeanisation 
 
On the domestic level, the external incentives model provides good insights. The most 
important difference between Serbia and Croatia is the degree to which the former 
political elites from the Yugoslav wars managed to retain political power over political 
veto points. The Croatian consensus on its European future only came about with the 
marginalisation of Tudjmanist political forces, which changed the country’s political 
interests and led to a considerable lowering of the adoption costs of the reforms. In 
Serbia, however, adoption costs remained considerably higher as they were raised 
through the personal and partisan interests of former SPS cronies controlling these veto 
points. Since political elites that face high adoption costs from the convergence to 
European norms continue to hold considerable influence, the selecting, adopting and 
implementing of these rules has become considerably more difficult for Serbia than for 
Croatia.  
Also, the social learning model provides a good tool to deduct certain mechanisms. 
Both in the case of Croatia and Serbia, the legacy of ethnic conflict formed a central 
obstacle for Europeanisation. The EU’s focus on transitional justice, and its self-assumed 
role as guarantor of the work of the ICTY contributed to a discourse of belonging that 
conveys that, in order to be part of the European family of states, the candidate states 
need to resolve their ethnic conflicts and cooperate with the ICTY. In Croatia, the 
Homeland War myth and the deification of indicted generals formed a clear 
expression of the lingering sentiments of ethnic tension that find their basis in the ethnic 
conflicts of the Yugoslav wars. These sentiments were politically used by the HDZ to 
oppose compliance with the ICTY. The same applies to Serbia and the SPS. For Croatia, 
the EU’s ICTY condition was perceived as an attack on the legitimacy of its newly 
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acquired statehood, and in Serbia it was perceived as a foreign attempt to further 
disintegrate Serbia and Montenegro. Due to the EU’s framing of ICTY cooperation as 
a European value, cooperation with the ICTY collided with domestic elites’ self-
perception and their perceptions of their respective countries’ statehoods. The 
rhetoric employed by the HDZ and SPS therefore undermined the EU’s legitimacy and 
with it the effectiveness of its efforts to Europeanise the respective countries. Only 
when the HDZ started to emphasise Croatia’s belonging to Europe, full cooperation 
with the ICTY became a permitted course of action in Croatia, unlike in Serbia. 
On the EU level, the external incentives model provides a good explanation for the 
effectiveness of the EU’s use of conditionality towards both candidate states. With 
Croatia the EU employed its conditionality at targeted moments in a consistent 
manner. It leveraged rewards for good behaviour mostly when Croatia faced a 
stalemate or risked sliding back on its progress. Conditionality was used as a last push 
to adopt or implement EU policy, offering tangible and direct rewards in return. The EU 
leveraged the opening of accession negotiations and final accession directly to 
corresponding reforms and followed up when the conditions were met. The gains for 
complying with the EU’s demands in the case of Croatia were therefore large and 
were awarded directly after compliance. In the case of Serbia, however, 
conditionality was employed inconsistently and the rewards for compliance seldom 
outweighed its political and economic costs. Serbia would often have to give up 
considerable political and economic benefits for relatively small rewards, and as the 
EU repeatedly acted inconsistently, Serbia felt insecure to make such commitments as 
the EU’s promises lacked credibility. The aspiring member states are weighing the 
benefits of complying with the EU’s conditionality against the costs thereof, meaning 
that the more direct and sizable the pay-off is, the more effective conditionality is likely 
to be.  
On the regional level, the different relations with Russia held by each candidate state 
have considerable effect on their Europeanisation. This is best explained through the 
external incentives model. While Croatia is relatively self-sufficient in its energy 
consumption and managed to limit Russian influence within the sector, it faced very 
little interference from third countries in its rule selection, adoption and 
implementation. Croatia even experienced pressure from third states to comply with 
the EU’s demands in both policy areas, and thus experienced relatively low adoption 
costs and higher benefits in the form of international recognition. This is in sharp 
contrast to Serbia, where Russian state capture through energy dependency and 
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political influence constrain Serbia’s ability to reform. Its adoption costs are severely 
raised by the political and economic costs that would come with alienating Russia. 
These costs outweigh the benefits that Serbia would gain from complying with the EU’s 
demands. The interference of regional powers can therefore have a serious effect on 
the prospects of a candidate state’s Europeanisation as it affects the balance of costs 
and benefits from adopting the EU’s proposed reforms.  
The social learning model provides very little explanation for the dynamics that were 
uncovered by the case studies. Rather than seeking to solve a concrete problem, 
drawing lessons from the experiences of the EU, Serbia and Croatia seem to pursue 
Europeanisation for the concrete benefits offered by the EU for doing so. Instead of 
complying with the ICTY to solve ethnic tensions within the Western Balkans, or 
implementing the Third Energy Package to solve unfair competition on own initiative, 
these instances of policy transfer were initiated by the EU rather than the candidate 
member states, regardless of their degree of success. 
 
Conclusion: Europeanisation in the Western Balkans – success and failure 
 
This paper set out to investigate why Croatia has been better able to converge to the 
EU’s acquis than Serbia. The findings presented by the paper’s case studies outline a 
complex interplay between the domestic politics of the candidate state, its 
perceptions of identity, the EU’s approach towards its enlargement policies, and the 
role of regional actors such as Russia. Altogether, the Europeanisation of Croatia and 
Serbia is driven by these dynamics in a fashion that corresponds to the external 
incentives model, supplemented with insights from the social learning model. 
Domestic political elites weigh the benefits that the compliance with the EU’s 
conditionality offer to their personal interests and party affiliations, against the 
adoption costs that they themselves would incur. As the political elites of the former 
authoritarian regimes experience higher adoption costs, their control over important 
veto points negatively affects the country’s ability to Europeanise. 
The EU’s construction of ICTY cooperation as a European value complicated the sense 
of belonging to Europe for domestic elites in the candidate states. Nationalist rhetoric 
used by these elites allows them to organise opposition to Europeanisation, building 
on pre-existing popular sentiments against foreign threats to the countries’ statehood. 
This type of rhetoric works as a double-edged sword as it increases public opposition 
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on the one hand and at the same time provides anti-Europeanisation elites with more 
control to oppose Europeanisation.   
Also the intervention of the EU through its employment of conditionality, and the 
interference of other regional powers have a clear effect on the Europeanisation of 
Serbia and Croatia. The more direct and sizable the rewards for compliance with EU 
rules offered by the EU, the higher the benefits attached to compliance with the EU’s 
conditionality, and the more likely these benefits outweigh the adoption costs of 
following EU policy. The same can be said of third-party interests that can either 
elevate the costs of policy transfer or enhance the benefits of the compliance with 
the EU. In this larger equation, the EU remains the primary driving force behind the 
process of policy transfer, as is notably demonstrated by the absence of evidence for 
the lesson-drawing model. As candidate states, Serbia and Croatia were less inclined 
to proactively seek the adoption of EU rules to address domestic issues, largely putting 
the EU in the driver’s seat of the enlargement process.  
In Croatia, the domestic political elites and the Croatian society came to a consensus 
on the country’s European future, the EU offered clear and sizable rewards for 
compliance, and there were no third-party interests that obstructed Croatia. As a 
result, Europeanisation in Croatia was successful. In Serbia, Europeanisation is failing as 
anti-Europeanisation elites remain in power, the EU fails to offer a clear and realistic 
perspective on EU membership and Russian interests dominate the Serbian economy 
and politics. Europeanisation in the Western Balkans is a difficult process, that depends 
on the willingness of the candidate state, and on the ability of the EU to sweeten the 
deal at the right moments. There thus lies a considerable responsibility with the EU in 
helping its candidate states to Europeanise, but the domestic factors and the place 
of the candidate state in the regional political scene must be right for the EU’s efforts 
to fall on fertile soil.  
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